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DOWNLOADING, DISTRIBUTING, AND 
DAMAGES IN THE DIGITAL DOMAIN: 
THE NEED FOR COPYRIGHT REMEDY REFORM 
Joe Donnini† 
Abstract 
Should copyright remedy laws be changed to address the 
proliferation of sharing of online content? On one hand, harsh 
penalties may improve compensation and infringement deterrence; on 
the other hand, harsh penalties may harm the interests of free 
expression and the enrichment of society through sharing. This article 
focuses on identifying the ideal level of enforcement and proposes a 
new remedy scheme to appropriately address social media sharing 
versus commercial misappropriation. 
In order to do that, Part I of this article explores the purposes of 
compensation and deterrence that are behind the copyright statutory 
remedy scheme. Thereafter, Part II sheds light on the history and 
policy choices made by courts and Congress as the remedy scheme 
evolved from the Copyright Act of 1790 up to the Copyright Act of 
1976. Part III analyzes the Copyright Act of 1976 with respect to 
damages as set forth in § 504. From this analysis, it is clear that there 
has been a theme of arbitrary and punitive awards that has carried 
over into the online world. Finally, Part IV recommends building a 
stronger foundation for a revised remedy scheme to address the 
original purposes of statutory damages in the new digital age. 
This article will reveal how the Copyright Act of 1976, with 
respect to statutory damages, was built upon an improper foundation. 
Therefore, the proposed changes in copyright remedies are designed 
to tie back to the purposes of compensation and deterrence, to meet 
the demands of the new media age. The article also recommends a 
two-tiered system that would more effectively balance the competing 
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interests of protecting expression and allowing sharing for societal 
benefit. The proposed system would allow courts flexibility in 
assessing damages while providing more directed guidance to prevent 
excessive awards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In order to know where we should be going with respect to 
copyright law remedy reform, it is helpful to understand where we 
have been and where we are currently. The starting point for this 
analysis dates back to the first United States copyright law enacted in 
1790.1 From there, the article explores the subsequent copyright acts 
and the courts’ interpretations of statutory damages. Seemingly, much 
inconsistency arises with respect to statutory damage applications, 
translating to arbitrary, excessive or even punitive awards. This 
inconsistency is extremely prevalent within the context of online 
digital domain cases. Much litigation and commentary surfaced 
relating to the downloading and distributing of online content and 
how to effectively compensate and deter infringement. While 
Congress had dealt with variations excepting from liability private 
non-commercial home use, these limited areas never materialized in 
the modern digital world—at least not yet. This article will examine 
and provide alternatives to this troubled statutory damage 
arrangement so that it may comply with the original purpose of 
statutory damages and the realities of the digital world. 
I. PURPOSE OF STATUTORY REMEDIES 
Why are there statutory damages for copyright infringement? 
Unlike other areas of intellectual property law, copyright always had 
a statutory remedy scheme since its inception.2 Back in 1899, the 
Court in Brady v. Daly stated that the purpose of statutory remedies is 
to provide full compensation to the proprietor of the infringed work 
for any damages sustained.3 In the event damages are difficult to 
prove, minimum recoveries are offered by a statutory scheme that 
 
 1. See generally Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790). 
 2. Id. This is a concept originally included in the Statute of Anne. See Act for the 
Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne), 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.). 
 3. Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 154 (1899). 
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allows for larger recoveries when and if actual damages can be 
proven.4 Penalties were not to be the purpose of the damages; rather 
the idea of damages focused upon compensation.5 Implied in this 
statement is the premise that statutory damages are an alternative to 
actual damages if actual damages are difficult to prove. For example, 
a defendant may have disposed of some of the physical goods 
infringed and kept inadequate records of sales; or it may be difficult 
to obtain information on lost license fees in markets a defendant may 
have actually sold infringed goods. It is arguable in these situations 
that damages may be challenging to prove and that having a statutory 
remedy would compensate the copyright owner by providing a 
minimum recovery. As we will see, the commentary from the Brady 
court regarding “minimum recoveries” has disappeared from the 
vocabulary of courts over the years. 
Furthermore, related to this notion of compensation is its 
cousin—deterrence. It is believed that by imposing a minimum level 
of recovery for the plaintiff, the defendant and possibly others will be 
deterred from infringement.6 It is possible that deterrence draws a fine 
line to punishment, but punishment is not the goal of copyright 
remedies.7 
While these concepts seem rather straightforward, their 
application in American copyright jurisprudence over the past two 
hundred years has been anything but straightforward. Thus, the 
question becomes whether courts and Congress have built a copyright 
statutory remedy scheme on a foundation that does not serve the 
intended purposes of compensation and possible deterrence. An 
unintended consequence of the application of statutory damages has 
been arbitrary, excessive, or punitive awards, continued infringements 
and a lack of balance between a fundamental theme of copyright law 
in general: balancing societal interests versus author’s incentive to 
create. As the digital age proliferates, now is the time to rebuild that 
 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. See Reed v. Inhabitants of Northfield, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 94, 101 (1832) (“All 
damages for neglect or breach of duty, operate to a certain extent as punishment; but the 
distinction is, that it is prosecuted for the purpose of punishment, and to deter others from 
offending in like manner.”); see also Bucklew v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., 329 F.3d 923, 
933 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that the purpose of allowing the plaintiff to recover the infringer’s 
lost profits is to make infringing “worthless to the infringer.”); McRoberts Software, Inc. v. 
Media 100, Inc., 329 F.3d 557, 568 (7th Cir. 2003) (“[L]ost profit damages eliminate a major 
incentive to steal the copyright instead of fairly negotiating for its use with the owner.”). 
 7. See Brady, 175 U.S. at 154. 
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foundation. It would be prudent to do so before courts continue to 
apply this statutory damage rule in ways that give courts too much 
leeway. This results in awards that are the equivalent of arbitrary, 
excessive, or punitive damages and out of line with traditional 
purposes. 
II. HISTORY OF STATUTORY REMEDIES: A LOOK AT THE COPYRIGHT 
ACT OF 1790 AND SUBSEQUENT ACTS UP TO THE COPYRIGHT 
ACT OF 1976 
A. Statutory Damages and Copyright Acts of 1790 and 1831 
with Subsequent Amendments 
The newly formed United States looked to its British roots in 
enacting the first federal copyright law.8 The Statute of Anne 
provided for a fundamental shift by giving protection to authors as 
opposed to publishers.9 Authors had a term of fourteen years for 
books to be published and twenty-one years for those books already 
in print at the time the statute came into effect on April 10, 1710.10 
Additionally, the Statue of Anne required the “offender” of any 
author’s copyright to forfeit the sum of “One Peny [sic] for every 
Sheet which shall be found in his, her, or their Custody, either Printed 
or Printing, Published or Exposed to Sale.”11 Half of this amount went 
to the author, with the other half going to the Crown.12 Presumably, 
since we are dealing with books, a per sheet infringement can equate 
to a sizable damage award—even back in the 1700’s. 
Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1790, which broadened 
the scope of authors’ rights outlined in the Statute of Anne by 
including not only books, but also maps and charts.13 Furthermore, 
section 2 of the Act set damages for published works at 50¢ for 
“every sheet which shall be found in [offender’s] possession.”14 Half 
of this amount went to the author while the other half went to the 
United States government.15 Section 6 provided for general damages 
 
 8. Act for the Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne), 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. 
Brit.). 
 9. Id. § 1. 
 10. Id. § 2. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed 1831). 
 14. Id. § 2. 
 15. Id. 
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for infringement upon unpublished works.16 The language of the 
Copyright Act of 1790 was almost identical to that of the Statute of 
Anne.17 
There have been several amendments to the Copyright Act of 
1790, which have expanded the statutory damage provisions. First, 
the Copyright Act of 1831 added musical compositions to the 
category of works18 and segregated infringements on published books 
at 50¢ per sheet,19 while infringements for every “map, chart, musical 
composition, print, cut, or engraving” shall be $1 per sheet.20 An 
amendment in 1856 changed statutory damages to the point that we 
started to see a range evolve.21 Granted, this amendment only dealt 
with adding protection for the right to publicly perform dramatic 
compositions, but it stated that damages cannot be less than $100 for 
the first infringement, and $50 for each subsequent infringement, as 
the court shall deem just.22 
In 1895 Congress amended the Copyright Act of 187023 by 
further delineating statutory damages as follows: $1 per sheet for 
infringements in all works then covered by the statute, except that in 
the case of a painting, status, and statuary, the amount increased to 
$10 per sheet.24 Notwithstanding that, damage amounts for “a 
photograph made from any object not a work of fine arts” were not to 
be less than $100 and not greater than $5,000.25 Damage amounts for 
any “painting, drawing, statue, engraving, etching, print, or model or 
design for a work of the fine arts or of a photograph of a work of the 
fine arts” were not to be less than $250 and not greater than 
$10,000.26 
The amounts set forth in the 1856 amendment regarding 
dramatic compositions remained the same. Thereafter, based upon the 
1897 amendment, any infringer of a dramatic or musical composition 
 
 16. Id. § 6. 
 17. Compare Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed 1831) with Act 
for the Encouragement of Learning (Statute of Anne), 1710, 8 Ann., c. 19 (Gr. Brit.). 
 18. Copyright Act of 1831, ch. 16, § 1, 4 Stat. 436, 436 (1831) (repealed 1909). 
 19. Id. § 6. 
 20. Id. § 7. 
 21. See Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (1856) (repealed 1870). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 194, 28 Stat. 965 (1895) (repealed 1909) (amending 
Copyright Act of 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198 (1870) (repealed 1952)). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
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faced not only monetary damages, but, if the infringement was 
“willful and for profit,” the infringer may have been charged with a 
misdemeanor and sentenced up to a year in jail.27 From the early days 
of applying copyright damages, the main goal was to compensate the 
plaintiff from the infringements, as opposed to punish the infringer.28 
It is clear how this evolution of the law from 1790 expanded the 
structure of a statutory damage scheme. 
B. Early Case Law on Statutory Damages 
As courts applied the damage aspect of these statutes to various 
cases, an unintended consequence of the application has been 
arbitrary or punitive damage awards. The following cases illustrate 
this issue. 
In Falk v. Heffron,29 the defendants made 2,400 copies of a 
photograph of actress and singer Lillian Russell, but had positioned 
approximately 21-22 photographs per sheet, equating to a total of 115 
sheets.30 At the time (1890s) the per-sheet infringement award totaled 
$1 per sheet31; therefore, the jury returned a verdict for 115 sheets, or 
$115.32 On appeal, while looking at the Copyright Act of 1790, the 
court clearly stated that the language of the statute provided for a per-
sheet award for each sheet found in a defendant’s possession.33 Since 
the evidence supported the jury’s finding, the award was affirmed.34 
In Bolles v. Outing Co.,35 defendant made a photogravure of a 
yacht photograph plaintiff had taken and then published it in a 
magazine without plaintiff’s consent.36 Since the plaintiff could only 
prove that defendant sold one copy of the work to plaintiff’s 
employee, the court found $1 in statutory damages under section 4965 
of the Revised Statutes.37 This statute required a defendant to turn 
over any plates whereby the copying had taken place and to pay $1 
for each sheet found in defendant’s possession (half to the plaintiff 
 
 27. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, ch. 4, 29 Stat. 481 (1897) (repealed 1909) (amending section 
4966 of the Revised Statutes, U.S. Rev. Stat. tit. 60, § 4966 (1873)). 
 28. Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 154 (1899). 
 29. Falk v. Heffron, 56 F. 299 (C.C.E.D.N.Y 1893). 
 30. Id. at 299. 
 31. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 169, 11 Stat. 138 (1856) (repealed 1870). 
 32. Falk, 56 F. at 299. 
 33. Id. at 300. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Bolles v. Outing Co., 175 U.S. 262 (1899). 
 36. Id. at 263. 
 37. Id. 
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and half to the U.S. government).38 Plaintiff’s argued that the number 
of copies of the magazine printed should be the measure for the $1 
recovery; while defendant argued that he only possessed the one copy 
that he sold to plaintiff’s employee. The court affirmed the 
defendant’s argument, awarding plaintiff $1 in damages.39 
The Bolles court stated that section 4965 of the Revised Statutes 
is 
clearly a penal statute in that it fixes a single and arbitrary measure 
of recompense to the plaintiff, irrespective of the damages actually 
sustained by him, or of the profits realized by the defendant; and in 
the further provision that one half of the amount recovered shall be 
to the use of the United States. It makes no pretence of awarding 
damages, and simply imposes a forfeiture of a specified sum.40 
The court further reasoned that since the statute was a penalty, it must 
be strictly construed and it would not expound the definition of 
“found in his possession.”41 
So what do these two case examples mean with respect to the 
unintended consequences of remedies becoming arbitrary and 
punitive? These cases show how the United States borrowed the “per 
sheet” basis for determining infringement from Britain’s Statute of 
Anne. By doing so, as copyright evolved, there’s no relationship 
between the sheets criteria and the actual realities of infringement that 
occur. I posit that these cases also show how the United States used 
statutory damages as an incoherent methodology for calculating 
damages that were not connected to any aspect of the cases. 
In Falk, rather than looking at the evidence of the allegedly 
infringed 2,400 copies, the court had no choice but to look at the 115 
sheets at issue. The statutory handcuff guided the court into 
determining that 115 sheets at $1 per sheet was the appropriate 
remedy. Rather than applying an actual damage award analysis to the 
2,400 alleged infringements, the focus was on the technical language 
of sheets so as to give a statutory award.42 While the court is correct 
in its application of the statutory language; there is a lack of 
connectivity between the infringements and the strict interpretation of 
the per sheet requirement of the statute. The effect is an arbitrary 
award having no causal connection to the infringement. It is 
 
 38. Id. at 264. 
 39. Id. at 268. 
 40. Id. at 264. 
 41. Id. at 265-66. 
 42. Falk v. Heffron, 56 F. 299, 300 (C.C.E.D.N.Y 1893). 
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challenging to argue that at least the statutory award is providing a 
minimum recovery for a plaintiff. While the dollar amount may be 
minimal, the calculation analysis is flawed since it’s not based upon 
anything other than the arbitrary statutory language. 
In Bolles, the Court unequivocally stated that the then current 
statute was a penalty.43 Both Bolles and Brady were decided in the 
same year—1899. In these cases, the Supreme Court proclaimed that 
either statutory damage provisions were penalties44 or nothing more 
than random assessments of damage bearing no basis to the 
infringement or facts of the case.45 Yet the United States continued 
with this premise, and built upon this jurisprudence with the passage 
of the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act).46 
C. Copyright Act of 1909 
Because it had been over 115 years since the last major 
enactment of a copyright statute, in 1905 President Roosevelt told 
Congress: 
  Our copyright laws urgently need revision. They are imperfect 
in definition, confused and inconsistent in expression; they omit 
provision for many articles which, under modern reproductive 
processes, are entitled to protection; they impose hardships upon 
the copyright proprietor which are not essential to the fair 
protection of the public; they are difficult for the courts to interpret 
and impossible for the Copyright Office to administer with 
satisfaction to the public. Attempts to improve them by amendment 
have been frequent, no less than 12 acts for the purpose having 
been passed since the Revised Statutes. To perfect them by further 
amendment seems impracticable. A complete revision of them is 
essential.47 
The President’s comments echoed those of Thorvald Solberg, then 
Register of Copyrights, who stated: 
It is doubtful if the enactment of further merely partial or 
temporizing legislation will afford satisfactory remedies for the 
insufficiencies and inconsistencies of the present laws. The subject 
should be dealt with as a whole, and the insufficient and antiquated 
 
 43. Bolles, 175 U.S. at 265. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Brady, 175 U.S. at 157. 
 46. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976). 
 47. H.R. REP. NO. 2222, at 1 (1909) (quoting President Theodore Roosevelt’s State of the 
Union address to Congress on December 5, 1905). 
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laws now in force be replaced by one consistent, liberal, and 
adequate statute. 
  The laws as they stand fail to give the protection required, are 
difficult of interpretation, application, and administration, leading 
to misapprehension and misunderstanding, and in some directions 
are open to abuses.48 
It appears, based upon the above language that one of the 
inadequacies referred to by Register Solberg related to damages. As 
we saw in the preceding section,49 the problems in the application of 
the Copyright Act of 1790 and subsequent revisions and amendments 
still left challenges in ascertaining proper damages and how to 
account for things such as an infringer’s profits. The original §§ 25 
and 28 of the 1909 Act50 (later codified as §§ 101 and 104, 
respectively, in a 1947 amendment51) sought to correct this issue by 
giving a plaintiff the option between getting actual damages and 
profits or statutory damages, “as to the court shall appear to be just.”52 
Additionally, Congress added recovery for infringer’s profits, 
requiring that plaintiff only prove sales, while the defendant had to 
prove “every element of cost which he claim[ed].”53 Section 28 
potentially criminalized infringements that were proven to be 
committed “willfully and for profit” by providing up to one year in 
prison or not less than $100 or greater than $1,000 in fines, or both.54 
In § 101, there are several categories of works; however, with 
respect to “undramatized or nondramatic work[s] by means of motion 
pictures”, where Congress specifically set forth damages at no greater 
than $100 so long as the infringer did not know he or she was 
infringing and it wasn’t reasonably foreseeable that they were 
infringing.55 By contrast, Congress also set forth, in the case of 
“dramatic or dramatico-musical work[s] by a maker of motion 
pictures and his agencies,” that if such infringer didn’t know they 
were infringing a work that they were distributing to exhibitors, and 
 
 48. Id. at 2 (quoting THORVALD SOLBERG, COPYRIGHT IN CONGRESS 1789-1904, 
COPYRIGHT OFF. BULL. NO. 8, at 7 (1905)). 
 49. See supra Part II.A-B. 
 50. Codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 25, 28 (1926). 
 51. Act of July 30, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-281, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652 (1947) (codified at 17 
U.S.C. §§ 101, 104 (1952)) (repealed 1976). 
 52. Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, §§ 25, 28, 35 Stat. 1075, 1081-82 (1909) (repealed 
1976). 
 53. Id. § 25. 
 54. Id. § 28. 
 55. Act of July 30, 1947, § 101(b), 61 Stat. at 661. 
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such infringements could not be reasonably foreseeable, then 
damages could not exceed $5,000 or be less than $250.56 We will 
explore this distinction further, drawing parallels when we talk about 
online content sharing and downloading versus distributing and how 
damages are assessed. 
While Congress enacted §§ 101 and 104 in order to clear up the 
inconsistencies, inadequacies, and confusion articulated by President 
Roosevelt and Register Solberg, history would prove that it did 
exactly the opposite. Let’s now take a look at the application of the 
1909 Act and its shortcomings. 
D. Interpretation of the Copyright Act of 1909 
Even though the damage provisions of the 1909 Act were much 
more detailed than they had been in past, ample room for ambiguity 
surfaced in the area of plaintiff’s lost profits and defendant’s gained 
profits.57 Several cases illustrate this point, which resulted in 
inequitable recoveries for plaintiffs.58 Granted, this profit analysis is 
 
 56. Id. 
 57. See, e.g., Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1376 (5th Cir. 1981) 
(holding that statute provided for recovery of both actual damages and profits, and that plaintiff 
was entitled to recover both); Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 592 F.2d 
651, 657 (2d Cir. 1978) (affirming an award of damages that found each defendant liable for 
half its realized profits and awarded statutory damages in lieu of plaintiff’s lost profits); Peter 
Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Jobela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F.2d 194, 196-97 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that the 
district court erred by failing to consider awarding statutory damages when appellant was unable 
to provide evidence of actual damages and infringer’s profits); Universal Pictures Co. v. Harold 
Lloyd Corp., 162 F.2d 354, 368, 375-76 (9th Cir. 1947) (affirming the lower court’s award of 
damages and upholding principle that uncertainty of lost profits does not bar recovery by 
plaintiff); Ziegelheim v. Flohr, 119 F. Supp. 324, 329 (E.D.N.Y 1954) (finding that plaintiff had 
overestimated its lost profits as well as defendant’s profits, and substituted its own calculation of 
damages); Gordon v. Weir, 111 F. Supp. 117, 123 (E.D. Mich. 1953), aff’d, 216 F.2d 508 (6th 
Cir. 1954) (unpublished table decision) (stating that Congress intended to mirror patent law 
damages with its new copyright statutes and that plaintiff was entitled, for each infringement, to 
recover either its actual damages or profits of defendants); Sebring Pottery Co. v. Steubenville 
Pottery Co., 9 F. Supp. 384, 385-86, 390 (N.D. Ohio 1934) (electing to award minimal statutory 
damages after finding difficulty in calculating damages where losses were largely intangible); 
Atlantic Monthly Co. v. Post Publ’g Co., 27 F.2d 556, 560 (D. Mass. 1928) (finding that 
damages were not warranted, but for purposes of appeal calculated lost profits and infringing 
profits, and found them to be far less than plaintiff submitted). 
 58. See, e.g., F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 231-34 
(1952) (awarding the plaintiff the statutory maximum of $5,000 in damages when defendant’s 
gross profits were only $899.16); Arthur A. Kaplan Co., v. Panaria Int’l, Inc., No. 96 CIV. 
7973(HB), 1998 WL 603225, at *5 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 11, 1998), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1321 (2d Cir. 
2000) (awarding $15,000 in damages despite evidence of $661.50 in gross revenue); see also 6 
WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 22:100 (2012) (“[W]here plaintiff recovers 
defendant’s profits, plaintiff may on occasion obtain a windfall, since such profits may be 
awarded where plaintiff has suffered no actual damages, or has suffered actual damages but in 
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not the same as excessive statutory damages, which will be discussed 
in Part III of this article, but the point is that since the 1909 Act the 
language has been unclear, the result has been various dollar ranges of 
remedies, that in some instances have created de facto double 
recovery, with no apportionment.59 As we will see, the inconsistent 
application of damages under the 1909 Act has equated to excessive 
damages, which still continues under the Copyright Act of 1976 
(1976 Act),60 particularly under statutory damages. The flexible 
language of “as the court shall appear to be just” of the 1909 Act has 
had the presumably unintended effect of creating excessive damage 
awards, which defeats the compensatory nature of copyright damages 
in the first place.61 
1. Case Law 
Some classic examples of this problem are illustrated in Turner 
& Dahnken v. Crowley.62 Turner involved an infringement of a 
copyrighted song written by Crowley called “My California Rose.”63 
While interpreting what was then § 25 (later § 101) of the 1909 Act, 
the trial court held that Crowley was entitled to $7,000 in statutory 
damages.64 The court determined that there existed 7,000 copies of 
the song in the infringer’s possession and/or control that were 
distributed after receiving notice of the infringement.65 Based upon 
§ 25, the court mandated $1 per infringing act, which in this case 
equated to 7,000 copies or $7,000 in statutory damages.66 Even 
though Crowley would have made only 8¢ per copy, or $560 in total 
profit, the court relied upon Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co.67 to justify 
higher award.68 The court in Gross agreed with district judge’s 
assertion that courts have a duty to estimate damages as best they 
 
an amount less than defendant gained from the infringement.”). 
 59. See, e.g., Miller, 650 F.2d at 1376; Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust, 592 F.2d at 657; 
Universal Pictures Co., 162 F.2d at 375-76. 
 60. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. (2011)). 
 61. See Brady v. Daly, 175 U.S. 148, 154 (1899) (noting that the purpose of statutory 
damages is to provide compensation, not to act as penalty). 
 62. Turner & Dahnken v. Crowley, 252 F. 749 (9th Cir. 1918). 
 63. Id. at 750. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Gross v. Van Dyk Gravure Co., 230 F. 412 (2d Cir. 1916). 
 68. Turner, 252 F. at 752-54. 
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could.69 
The Ninth Circuit in Turner ruled on appeal that while courts can 
use discretion where no proof of actual damages is set forth, they 
must have relation to “whole case of infringement” and must not be 
punitive.70 The appellate court reduced the statutory damage award 
from $7,000 to $560.71 While this particular decision was reversed on 
appeal, the trial courts clearly were not employing any causal 
connection between evidence of plaintiff’s damages and the amount 
actually awarded under the concept of what a court deems just. 
The inconsistencies continued in Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn 
Pictures Corporation.72 In this case, the defendants had infringed 
upon plaintiffs’ play entitled “Dishonored Lady.”73 Although liability 
was determined, the main issue was how to apportion damages 
attributable to the infringement.74 The language of § 25(b) provided 
for actual damages and profits, or in lieu, such damages as the court 
deemed just.75 Since actual damages were proven, the focus shifted to 
apportionment.76 Based upon expert testimony, the district court 
stated it believed that damages should be apportioned to be 25% of 
defendants’ profits; however, the court ruled that all defendants’ net 
profits should go to plaintiffs, to ensure it was keeping in line with 
precedent.77 
As for the court of appeals, it determined that plaintiff’s damages 
should be one-fifth of defendant’s net profits.78 After the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari, it ruled that apportionment could be 
accomplished and that expert testimony would serve to guide that 
calculation.79 If courts do not apportion damages, the result would be 
inequity and equate to being a penalty,80 which is not the purpose of 
copyright damages.81 Ultimately, the Supreme Court upheld the 
appellate court’s ruling, since expert testimony showed that damages 
 
 69. Gross, 230 F. at 413-14. 
 70. Turner, 252 F. at 754. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940). 
 73. Id. at 396. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 399. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 398. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 405. 
 80. Id. 
 81. See supra Part I. 
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attributable to the infringement ranged from 5% to 12%.82 This case 
focused on actual damages as opposed to the statutory damage 
provision, yet the rationale regarding inequity and penalty is 
applicable to both actual and statutory damages. 
Now it may appear that this result seems just fine as plaintiff is 
getting actual damages attributable to defendant’s infringement. There 
appears to be a single recovery of damages, with no excessive 
damages being awarded. This may have been fine if the Supreme 
Court stayed with this interpretation of the 1909 Act’s damages 
provision. The ambiguity started to unveil when the Supreme Court 
just twelve years later decided F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary 
Arts, Inc.,83 a case that appears to result in permitting cumulative 
damages that equate to excessive recovery. 
Quite frankly, the Court’s reasoning in F.W. Woolworth 
regarding applicable damages is troubling. There are no clear 
standards for enforcing § 101, and the Court ultimately contradicts the 
reasoning in Sheldon.84 In this case, there were infringements of a 
statuette of a cocker spaniel that were being sold in F.W. Woolworth 
retail stores.85 After the court determined liability, F.W. Woolworth 
proved that its gross profit from the infringement was $899.16.86 
Nonetheless, the Court stated that $5,000 in statutory damages was 
appropriate and upheld the appellate court’s decision.87 As the Court 
reasoned, citing Douglas v. Cunningham: 
  The phraseology of the section [regarding statutory damages] 
was adopted to avoid the strictness of construction incident to a 
law imposing penalties, and to give the owner of a copyright some 
recompense for injury done him, in a case where the rules of law 
render difficult or impossible proof of damages or discovery of 
profits.88 
But, isn’t imposing penalties exactly what the Court did by ignoring 
the $899.16 in actual proven damages, and instead ordering the then 
maximum statutory amount? It seems as if the Court is stretching for 
justification to allow the maximum statutory amount of $5,000 though 
the evidence showed otherwise. The Court continued to validate 
 
 82. Id. at 408. 
 83. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228 (1952). 
 84. Id. at 235 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 85. Id. at 229 (majority opinion). 
 86. Id. at 230. 
 87. Id. at 234. 
 88. Id. at 231 (quoting Douglas v. Cunningham, 294 U.S. 207, 209 (1935)). 
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random calculations, as long as they were within the statutory 
framework as shown in F.W. Woolworth: 
  To fulfill that purpose, the statute has been interpreted to vest in 
the trial court broad discretion to determine whether it is more just 
to allow a recovery based on calculation of actual damages and 
profits, as found from evidence, or one based on a necessarily 
somewhat arbitrary estimate within the limits permitted by the Act. 
  . . . . 
  Moreover, a rule of liability which merely takes away the profits 
from an infringement would offer little discouragement to 
infringers. It would fall short of an effective sanction for 
enforcement of the copyright policy. The statutory rule, formulated 
after long experience, not merely compels restitution of profit and 
reparation for injury but also is designed to discourage wrongful 
conduct. The discretion of the court is wide enough to permit a 
resort to statutory damages for such purposes. Even for uninjurious 
and unprofitable invasions of copyright the court may, if it deems 
it just, impose a liability within statutory limits to sanction and 
vindicate the statutory policy.89 
This begs the original question: Do we want copyright damages 
to be an “arbitrary estimate” as the F.W. Woolworth court espouses 
above? Having damages speculative or within a wide range is 
contrary not only to intellectual property law, but to the inherent 
element of foreseeability in general damages law. We should not have 
parties in copyright infringement actions be subject to arbitrary 
estimates nor “sanctions” as the Court mentions above. If the Court is 
indicating that the policy behind such calculation of statutory 
damages is to “discourage wrongful conduct” by imposing sanctions, 
this seems to clearly equate to penalties, which was not the legislative 
purpose behind enacting statutory damages.90 Further, scholars such 
as Professor Samuelson clearly addressed the concern that statutory 
damages should not equate to penalties since there would be 
constitutional violations.91 
Interpretation of the 1909 Act left many unanswered questions. 
Did § 101 require that a plaintiff could choose between either 
 
 89. Id. at 231-33. 
 90. See supra Part I (discussing the purpose of statutory remedies); see also Pamela 
Samuelson & Tara Wheatland, Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in Need of 
Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 450-51 (2009). 
 91. See Samuelson & Wheatland, supra note 90, at 480-97 (discussing “examples of 
cases in which copyright statutory damage awards have been grossly excessive and inconsistent 
with the Supreme Court’s due process jurisprudence.”). 
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statutory damages or actual damages? And if either one was chosen 
(by plaintiff or the court), were they cumulative or did they stand 
alone? If profits were to be included, how were they apportioned? 
These unanswered questions left the door open for confusion. By 
implying arbitrariness, penalties, and a seemingly obvious 
contradiction to the rationale of Sheldon, the F.W. Woolworth court 
had certainly created ambiguity as to how § 101 worked. It appears 
that this ambiguity was furthered in other circuits by permitting 
excessive damages that sometimes included both profits and statutory 
damages.92 
The foregoing cases illustrate a sampling of the divisiveness and 
confusion over application of statutory damages; however, it wasn’t 
just the courts that became cognizant of this ambiguity. Former 
Register of Copyrights, Abraham Kaminstein, vocalized challenges 
with the 1909 Act and wrote to Congress about it in 1961.93 While the 
law on copyright damages was evolving up to this point, courts 
slipped into a pattern of inconsistent interpretation, and often were not 
in tune with the alleged legislative framework’s purposes of 
compensation and deterrence. We now explore how the stage was set 
for further reform that ultimately led to the enactment of the 1976 
Act. 
2. Register of Copyright’s Comments on Needed Reform 
While the courts were in conflict over the application of 
damages, both in terms of applying actual damages and/or profits 
and/or statutory damages, Register Kaminstein drafted his concerns 
over copyright remedies.94 Although he stated several concerns with 
respect to copyright damages, his focus seems to center upon 
statutory damages and innocent infringers. 
a. Statutory Damages 
Register Kaminstein agreed with the concept of statutory 
 
 92. See, e.g., F.E.L. Publ’ns, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 754 F.2d 216, 219 (7th Cir. 
1985) (stating that a trial judge may award statutory damages “in lieu of or in addition to actual 
damages”); Lottie Joplin Thomas Trust v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 592 F.2d 651, 657 (2d Cir. 
1978) (stating that statutory and actual damages are not mutually exclusive); Fitzgerald Publ’g 
Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 670 F. Supp. 1133, 1141 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (awarding plaintiff both 
actual and statutory damages). 
 93. H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 87TH CONG., REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW ix-x (Comm. Print 
1961). 
 94. Id. at 101-07. 
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damages;95 however, he stated the application was not clear.96 For 
example, § 101(b) set forth a schedule of different amounts of 
damages for difference types of works for each infringement or 
performance.97 According to Register Kaminstein, this part of the 
statute proved to be faulty 
because the amounts are arbitrary and the number of copies or 
performances is only one of many factors to be considered in 
assessing damages. In most cases the courts have not applied the 
mathematical formula of the schedule, and in a few cases where 
this has been done the results are questionable. To some extent the 
fear of excessive awards under the present statute is founded on the 
possibility of a merely mathematical application of the schedule. 
The schedule adds a needless complication to the scheme of 
statutory damages. We would omit it.98 
It appears that while Register Kaminstein was not opposed to 
statutory damages as serving the compensatory and deterrent 
purposes, he recognized the challenges of excessive awards that 
resulted from too much flexibility given to courts in their application. 
Interestingly enough, he uses the word “arbitrary” in his description 
of statutory amounts as did the court in F.W. Woolworth.99 It’s 
disturbing that a theme of arbitrariness seemed to develop with 
respect to calculation of copyright damages, yet there’s no 
fundamental addressing of this concept in furtherance of the goals of 
compensation and deterrence. 
b. Innocent Infringers 
Register Kaminstein’s report also indicates that there should be 
more room for protection of innocent infringers and that the burden of 
proving innocence rests upon the alleged innocent infringer.100 At that 
time the minimum statutory damage award equated to $250.101 The 
Register stated that there had been commentary that the mandatory 
minimum amount of $250 be eliminated for innocent infringers.102 
Under § 101(b), he further realized that doing so would be more 
 
 95. Id. at 102. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 104. 
 98. Id. at 106. 
 99. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 232 (1952). 
 100. See REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE 
U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 93, at 103-04. 
 101. Id. at 103. 
 102. See id. 
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consistent with what was already in place for innocent infringers in 
three distinct categories: reproductions of newspaper photographs 
($50-$200 range),103 $100 as the maximum statutory damage if one 
innocently infringes nondramatic works in motion pictures;104 and 
$100 as the maximum statutory damage if one innocently infringes 
nondramatic literary works in broadcasts.105 Since there were already 
three carved out categories, he felt that it would be “equally 
justify[able]” to apply it to other situations involving innocent 
infringers,106 which in turn would position the mandatory minimum 
becoming irrelevant or non-existent. 
Register Kaminstein did not advocate for abolishing the 
mandatory minimum for innocent infringers (as I alluded to that being 
a probable effect in the previous sentence); rather, he wanted the 
statutory minimum flexible for courts to be able to evaluate whether 
an innocent infringer met the burden of proof establishing his or her 
innocence, and if met, have the discretion to not award any 
damages.107 Register Kaminstein felt that this standard would also 
eliminate the three carve-outs for innocent infringers, which added, in 
his opinion, to the inconsistency and “special treatment” implying 
inequitable results.108 
Various interpretations of copyright law through 1960 show us 
that actual damages and profits and statutory damages are being 
effectuated excessively and inconsistently.109 This causes one to 
question whether the compensatory and deterrent theories behind 
copyright law remedies are being adequately served. I say no, and 
base that upon the cases illustrated and referenced in this article, as 
well as Register Kaminstein’s comments. Additionally, it is fairly safe 
to argue that during the 1960s most would not oppose reform of the 
copyright remedy laws. The true question is how do we solve these 
problems of excessive awards and inconsistency in application by 
courts? Much effort and time went into the creation of the 1976 
 
 103. Id. at 104. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 102-03; see also F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228 
(1952) (awarding the plaintiff the statutory maximum of $5,000 in damages when defendant’s 
gross profits were only $899.16); Arthur A. Kaplan Co. v. Panaria Int’l, Inc., No. 96 CIV. 
7973(HB), 1998 WL 603225 (S.D.N.Y Sept. 11, 1998), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1321 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(awarding $15,000 in damages despite evidence of $661.50 in gross revenue). 
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Act.110 It was believed that creating § 504 of the 1976 Act would 
alleviate these problems. Unfortunately, as we shall see, the problem 
not only continued but got worse in the new online world called the 
“digital domain.” 
III. EVOLUTION OF STATUTORY REMEDIES: THE COPYRIGHT ACT OF 
1976 AND REMEDIES REVISITED 
A. Section 504 of the Copyright Act of 1976 
After many years of preparation and meetings and 
acknowledging the need for a fundamental change to copyright laws, 
Congress finally enacted a completely new copyright act.111 This act 
is much more detailed and it has fundamentally changed copyright 
laws as we knew them.112 If one looks at the general comments 
regarding damages in the legislative history of the 1976 Act, 
Congress’s intent is clear: 
to give the courts specific unambiguous directions concerning 
monetary awards, thus avoiding the confusion and uncertainly that 
have marked the present law on the subject, and, at the same 
time, . . . to provide the courts with reasonable latitude to adjust 
recovery to the circumstances of the case, thus avoiding some of 
the artificial or overly technical awards resulting from the language 
of the existing statute.113 
Congress felt that § 504(a) permitted recovery for actual damages 
plus infringer’s profits or statutory damages.114 The plaintiff could 
 
 110. See WILLIAM S. STRAUSS, COPYRIGHT OFFICE STUDY NO. 22: THE DAMAGE 
PROVISIONS OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW (Comm. Print 1956). 
 111. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 504, 90 Stat. 2541 (1976) (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. § 504 (2011)). 
 112. See H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659; STRAUSS, 
supra note 110. See also Jasper v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 2d 334, 341 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that the copyright act made “major changes in pre-existing copyright 
law”); Peer Int’l Corp. v. Latin Am. Music Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 38, 46 (D.P.R. 2001) (noting 
that the 1976 Copyright Act “overhauled the copyright system by introducing many changes”); 
Encyclopaedia Britannica Educ. Corp. v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243, 248 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(stating that the Copyright Revision Act of 1976 made “extensive changes in the copyright law, 
many of which were designed to address issues raised by rapidly changing technology”). See 
generally Robert A. Gorman, An Overview of the Copyright Act of 1976, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 856 
(1978). 
 113. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161. 
 114. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(a)-(b) (2011). 
(a) In General.—Except as otherwise provided by this title, an infringer of 
copyright is liable for either— 
 (1) the copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits of the 
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make the election of actual damages plus infringer’s profits or 
statutory damages as set forth in § 504(c).115 And, if statutory 
 
infringer, as provided by subsection (b); or 
 (2) statutory damages, as provided by subsection (c). 
(b) Actual Damages and Profits.—The copyright owner is entitled to recover the 
actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any 
profits of the infringer that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken 
into account in computing the actual damages. In establishing the infringer’s 
profits, the copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer’s 
gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible 
expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the 
copyrighted work. 
Id. 
 115. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 162; see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
(c) Statutory Damages.— 
 (1) Except as provided by clause (2) of this subsection, the copyright owner 
may elect, at any time before final judgment is rendered, to recover, instead of 
actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages for all infringements 
involved in the action, with respect to any one work, for which any one infringer 
is liable individually, or for which any two or more infringers are liable jointly 
and severally, in a sum of not less than $750 or more than $30,000 as the court 
considers just. For the purposes of this subsection, all the parts of a compilation 
or derivative work constitute one work. 
 (2) In a case where the copyright owner sustains the burden of proving, and 
the court finds, that infringement was committed willfully, the court in its 
discretion may increase the award of statutory damages to a sum of not more than 
$150,000. In a case where the infringer sustains the burden of proving, and the 
court finds, that such infringer was not aware and had no reason to believe that 
his or her acts constituted an infringement of copyright, the court in its discretion 
may reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than $200. The 
court shall remit statutory damages in any case where an infringer believed and 
had reasonable grounds for believing that his or her use of the copyrighted work 
was a fair use under section 107, if the infringer was: (i) an employee or agent of 
a nonprofit educational institution, library, or archives acting within the scope of 
his or her employment who, or such institution, library, or archives itself, which 
infringed by reproducing the work in copies or phonorecords; or (ii) a public 
broadcasting entity which or a person who, as a regular part of the nonprofit 
activities of a public broadcasting entity (as defined in section 118(f)) infringed 
by performing a published nondramatic literary work or by reproducing a 
transmission program embodying a performance of such a work. 
 (3) (A) In a case of infringement, it shall be a rebuttable presumption that the 
infringement was committed willfully for purposes of determining relief if the 
violator, or a person acting in concert with the violator, knowingly provided or 
knowingly caused to be provided materially false contact information to a 
domain name registrar, domain name registry, or other domain name registration 
authority in registering, maintaining, or renewing a domain name used in 
connection with the infringement. 
 (B) Nothing in this paragraph limits what may be considered willful 
infringement under this subsection. 
 (C) For purposes of this paragraph, the term “domain name” has the meaning 
given that term in section 45 of the Act entitled “An Act to provide for the 
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damages were elected, nothing prevented the courts from using 
evidence of actual damages and profits in calculating the statutory 
damage award.116 Congress continued by stating that § 504(b) 
recognizes the “different purposes” of awarding actual damages 
versus profits.117 Actual damages are “to compensate the copyright 
owner for losses from the infringement;”118 whereas, recovery of 
defendant’s profits can be obtained “to prevent the infringer from 
unfairly benefiting from a wrongful act.”119 The first part of this 
statement appears to address the goals of compensation, while the 
second part appears to address the goals of deterrence. Furthermore, 
in assessing actual damages and profits, courts are supposed to 
prevent double recovery by not calculating the same damage under 
both categories.120 It is the defendant’s burden to show that any profit 
made was not “attributable to the infringement” so that proper 
apportionments can be ascertained.121 
Now, as a part of the statutory damage scheme, courts were 
given latitude to increase damage awards up to $50,000122 in the event 
plaintiff could prove “willful infringement,” and decrease damage 
awards to a low of $100123 where the defendant proves it is an 
“innocent infringer”.124 The claimed purpose of having a minimum 
statutory damage amount for an innocent infringer is to preserve the 
deterrent effect, so the innocent infringer still faces liability if plaintiff 
cannot disprove his or her innocence.125 Yet if the burden of proof is 
on the defendant to prove innocence, and defendant meets the burden 
by providing sufficient evidence, should it matter whether plaintiff 
can refute defendant’s innocence finding? In other words, should it be 
 
registration and protection of trademarks used in commerce, to carry out the 
provisions of certain international conventions, and for other purposes” approved 
July 5, 1946 (commonly referred to as the “Trademark Act of 1946”; 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1127). 
Id. 
 116. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161. 
 117. Id.; see also 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). 
 118. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id.; see also § 504(b). 
 121. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161; see also § 504(b). 
 122. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 162. This later changed, and amounts have since gone up 
to $150,000. See § 504(c)(2). 
 123. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 162. Amounts have since gone up to $200 per 
infringement. See § 504(c)(2). 
 124. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 162-63. 
 125. Id. at 163. 
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that so long as defendant meets that burden, defendant is innocent and 
similar to other areas of law, would not incur any liability and 
subsequent damages? These questions may have been debated prior to 
enactment of the 1976 Act, but they were never answered directly.126 
So far, the basic language of § 504 sounds easy enough for 
courts to follow to avoid the excessiveness and inconsistency 
affiliated with prior law. As the world became more technologically 
advanced, however, statutory damages came into application more 
often, bringing more uncertainty and inconsistent application, as we 
will see from the following cases. 
B. Courts’ Continued Confusion: Applying Statutory Remedies 
Based Upon § 504 
The term “willfulness” set forth in § 504(c)(2) has not been 
clearly defined by Congress. Based upon the language “willfully,” 
there’s an implication that an infringer must have the requisite intent 
to infringe; however, we get no further delineation on definitions 
from Congress. Therefore, some commentators have equated 
willfulness to knowledge, meaning that if an infringer knows that they 
are infringing, then the infringement is willful.127 On the other hand, 
some courts have decided that willful means proof of something less 
than actual knowledge.128 Furthermore, other courts have held that 
knowledge and hence willfulness can be proved if it can be shown 
that the infringer acted with “reckless disregard” with respect to the 
infringement.129 
Additionally, the concept of innocent infringer is not defined in 
§ 504(c)(2). The language of the statute provides that if the infringer 
“was not aware and had no reason to believe that his or her acts 
constituted an infringement of copyright,”130 then the consequence is 
 
 126. The act does carve out exceptions from statutory liability for teachers, librarians, 
archivists, and public broadcasters (and their institutions) if they honestly believe what they 
were doing constituted a fair use. § 504(c)(2). If you are innocent by not believing you have 
infringed on any copyright, you are free from liability, and, furthering this logic, it would appear 
that if a defendant proved his or her innocence, there does not need to be any burden shifting for 
plaintiff to disprove, nor any statutory minimum award to deter future infringements. 
 127. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 14-
04[B][3] (2010); see also Fitzgerald Publ’g Co. v. Baylor Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d 1110, 1115 (2d 
Cir. 1986). 
 128. Fitzgerald Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d at 1115 (citing Fallaci v. New Gazette Literary 
Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1172, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)). 
 129. Id. (citing Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills Inc., 519 F. Supp. 730, 733 
(S.D.N.Y. 1981)). 
 130. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2). 
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not relief from liability, but rather a reduction in statutory damages. 
The implication here is that the infringer has no actual or constructive 
knowledge of the infringement. Furthermore, the categorization of 
innocent infringer is not available if the plaintiff complied with 17 
U.S.C. §§ 401(d), 402(d), or 405(b) regarding notice on the 
copyrighted work.131 If the plaintiff has appropriately labeled their 
copyrighted work in compliance with these sections, then an innocent 
infringement defense becomes unavailable. So, in essence, there is a 
sliding scale from $200 per infringement if innocence is proven to 
$150,000 per infringement if willfulness is proven, and quite a bit of 
an unknown in between. This leaves courts with a wide range of 
leeway in determining willfulness versus innocence, with a 
corresponding wide range of dollar amounts awarded on this 
continuum of vagueness. 
We see that this gap between the two extremes lends itself to 
whatever the court deems just in accordance with § 504(c)(1). This 
paradigm of escalation or reduction of statutory damages seems to be 
incoherent. It does not appear to serve the purposes of compensation 
and deterrence, since it is so wide spread and there is no evidence that 
infringements have curtailed.132 One can argue that any amount 
awarded would grant compensation to the plaintiff; however, if that 
amount is arbitrary and not based upon any benchmarks, it is contrary 
to our jurisprudence on reasonableness and foreseeability in damages 
law.133 Moreover, it perpetuates the inconsistencies we have seen in 
the application of copyright law from 1790 to the date. 
Having no clear basis for what willful and innocence mean, we 
end up with courts talking about what they think these two terms 
mean. For example, in Fitzgerald Publishing Company, the court 
concluded, “It is plain that ‘willfully’ infringing and ‘innocent intent’ 
are not the converse of one another. Thus, it is possible in the same 
action for a plaintiff not to be able to prove a defendant’s willfulness, 
and, at the same time, for the defendant to be unable to show that it 
acted innocently.”134 Assuming this proposition is true, where does 
that leave us? Confused? Or should a court just pick $14,500 per 
 
 131. See id. §§ 401(d), 402 (d), 405(b). 
 132. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. DFK Entertainment, LLC, No. 1:10-cv-1393 
(GLS/DRH), 2012 WL 893470 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2012) (granting plaintiff’s motion for 
summary judgment on five counts of willful copyright infringement by defendants). 
 133. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351 (1981); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (1979). 
 134. Fitzgerald Publ’g Co., 807 F.2d at 1115. 
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infringement since that is the approximate midpoint between $750 
and $30,000 (the statutory amounts of damages not involving 
willfulness or innocence). Establishing a framework whereby courts 
and/or juries could still have equitable powers to award damages 
within non-arbitrary or excessive parameters would serve the overall 
damage structure. 
1. Case Law—Music 
Speaking of the concepts of arbitrariness and excessiveness, 
which were introduced early on in this article, our more recent line of 
cases serve as clear illustrations of how those concepts have 
permeated more modern case law. The most obvious and arguably the 
most notorious cases involve the music industry. We will explore 
three of those cases to demonstrate how the application of statutory 
damages in the modern era is applied using the weak statutory 
damage foundation built from the beginning of U.S. copyright law. 
In Capital Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, the defendant had 
infringed copyrighted sound recordings by downloading and 
distributing them via online peer-to-peer file sharing applications 
(namely, one known as KaZaA or Kazaa).135 During the first trial, the 
jury found willful infringement on twenty-four of plaintiff’s sound 
recordings and awarded the plaintiffs $9,250 per infringement 
equating to $222,000 total.136 Upon defendant’s motion, the court 
vacated the award and granted a new trial based upon jury instruction 
error.137 At the second trial, the jury found willful infringement on 
twenty-four of sound recordings, and this time awarded plaintiffs 
$80,000 for each song, or $1.92 million.138 The trial court remitted 
this amount to $54,000 in January of 2010, which plaintiffs refused to 
accept, thus necessitating a third trial solely on the damage issue.139 In 
November 2010, the jury awarded plaintiffs $1.5 million.140 In July 
2011, the court reduced the award to $54,000 as it did previously in 
January 2010.141 In August 2011, plaintiffs filed an appeal to contest 
 
 135. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 680 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1049 (D. Minn. 
2010). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1050. 
 139. See id. at 1061. 
 140. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999, 1003 (D. Minn. 2011), 
vacated, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-715 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2012). 
 141. Id. at 1001. 
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these damages.142 One of plaintiffs’ arguments was that “actual 
damages are irrelevant to statutory damages” and thus the award 
should be upheld out of deference to the latitude Congress gave in 
enacting the statutory damages.143 In 2012 the original judgment was 
vacated on appeal, followed by Thomas-Rasset’s petition for writ of 
certiorari to the Supreme Court.144 
The fact that this case has gone through multiple phases of trial 
with respect to the damage award questions effective use of judicial 
resources, particularly with respect to the jury’s verdict. Under the 
Williams standard, which assesses the constitutionality of damage 
awards so as not to be oppressive or disproportionate to the offense,145 
 
 142. See Opening Brief of Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 1, Capitol Records, Inc. v. 
Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012) (Nos. 11-2820, 11-2858). 
 143. See id. at 56-57. Plaintiff’s arguments include that the lower court judge (Judge 
Davis) erred in stating that the statutory damage awards were unconstitutional because due 
process wasn’t protected since there was no relationship between actual and statutory damages. 
See id at 54-59; see also Brief of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 21, Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d 999 (No. 11-
2820). Ironically, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) argues that the district 
court’s lowering the statutory damage award after three juries have held otherwise “employs an 
arbitrary and unprecedented method of calculating statutory damages for willful infringement.” 
Id. While the MPAA certainly has legitimate objectives in protecting works of authorship, the 
MPAA may not be recognizing that their reliance upon St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. 
Williams may be misplaced. Williams and subsequent cases’ rationales may not be congruent 
with the purposes of compensation and deterrence, since we still have excessive awards and 
infringements continue to occur in the digital age. See St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. Ry. Co. v. 
Williams, 251 U.S. 63, 64 (1919) (involving a railroad that overcharged passengers by 66¢, but 
was charged $75 under a statutory damages theory). The MPAA may be highlighting only 
aspects of Williams and its progeny that give rise to a faulty foundation of statutory damage 
analysis, by showing how Williams and subsequent cases awarded statutory damages that were 
excessive or unreasonable, but upheld. Williams stands for the proposition that when a court 
evaluates statutory damage awards, they are unconstitutional only if the award is “‘so severe and 
oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the offense and obviously unreasonable.’” Brief of 
the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc., supra at 24 (quoting Williams, 251 U.S. at 67). 
Isn’t that exactly what Judge Davis in the Thomas-Rasset decided? Interestingly enough, the 
MPAA doesn’t spend much time addressing BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, where a $4 
million dollar punitive award was reduced by the Supreme Court as “grossly excessive.” See 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996). Granted, BMW of North America did 
not deal with statutory copyright damages, but it did lay out three guideposts: “the degree of 
reprehensibility of the nondisclosure; the disparity between the harm or potential harm suffered 
by [plaintiff] and [his/her] punitive damages award; and the difference between this remedy and 
the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.” Id.; see also Samuelson & 
Wheatland, supra note 90, at 480-85. 
 144. Capitol Records, Inc. v. Thomas-Rasset, 692 F.3d 899 (8th Cir. 2012), ), petition for 
cert. filed, No. 12-715 (U.S. Dec. 12, 2012). 
 145. See Williams, 251 U.S. at 66-67 (stating that constitutional limitations are triggered 
“where the penalty prescribed is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportioned to the 
offense and obviously unreasonable”). 
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the district court finds the $1.5 million verdict in violation of the 
Constitution and reduces it to $54,000.146 The court discusses how 
Thomas-Rasset is a non-commercial user not acting for a profit as 
opposed to commercial infringers who are more susceptible to large 
statutory damage awards because they have “enormous” potential for 
a gain in revenues from the infringement.147 The thought is that 
Congress set a high maximum for statutory damages so that any 
award for infringement could be large enough to outweigh an 
infringer’s potential gain.148 Here, the court explains that Thomas-
Rasset’s potential gain is not large enough as a private individual as 
compared to the verdict.149 The court continues that statutory damages 
must bear some relationship to actual damages, carefully commenting 
that there’s no requirement that plaintiff must prove actual 
damages.150 The 1976 Act is clear that statutory damages are to be 
“instead” of actual damages.151 
Thomas-Rasset is “one of more than 2 million users sharing 
more than 800 million files on [that] day.”152 The court states that 
although she is the one who got caught she should not have to pay for 
the damages caused by millions of others who have not yet been 
caught. It just so happened she got “caught, sued, and subjected to a 
jury trial.”153 
Here, from the issues revealed at the trials, we see two 
realizations emerge: (1) calculation of statutory damages is confusing 
since there is no guidance on how to do so, which, invokes 
constitutional issues of due process violations since awards are so 
large and disproportionate; and (2) there seems be an innate notion 
that a distinction between commercial and non-commercial 
infringements is tied to how statutory damages are interpreted. 
Without directly mentioning it on these two points, the district court 
implies that invoking § 504(c) as is does not serve the damage 
purposes of compensation and deterrence. 
In Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, the defendant, 
Joel Tenenbaum, had been downloading and distributing copyrighted 
 
 146. See Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1001. 
 147. Id. at 1010. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Id. at 1011. 
 150. Id. 
 151. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2011); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 161 (1976). 
 152. Thomas-Rasset, 799 F. Supp. 2d at 1011. 
 153. Id. 
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sound recordings by using file-sharing software without the 
permission of the copyright owners (similar to Jammie Thomas-
Rasset).154 Initially, the Tenenbaum plaintiffs were awarded $675,000 
in statutory damages.155 The district court judge claimed the amount 
was excessive and unconstitutional, and the judge lowered the amount 
by 90% to $67,500.156 On appeal, the court reversed the lower court 
and reinstated the $675,000 amount.157 The appellate court stated that 
the lower court judge should not have addressed the constitutionality 
of the damages issue.158 The trial court first should have used the 
procedural mechanism of remittitur, which is a common law doctrine 
permitting a court to reduce an award believed to be grossly excessive 
so as to shock the conscience of the court.159 The case was remanded 
to the lower court to be evaluated under the doctrine of remittitur, 
under which plaintiffs have the option of accepting a reduced award 
or go back to trial on the issue of damages.160 
While the procedural history in the Tenenbaum case may differ 
from the Thomas-Rasset case, they fundamentally deal with the same 
issue of arbitrary or excessive statutory damage awards. Both 
defendants knew that they were infringing on copyrighted works, so 
they should face consequences. The question becomes how much of a 
consequence in terms of monetary damage awards. The courts have 
no clear guidance to ascertain award amounts that will both 
compensate the plaintiffs and also deter future infringements. Rather, 
the courts give deference to Congress to change the law and focus 
upon no constitutional violations of due process. 
As pointed out earlier in this article, the Thomas-Rasset case 
illustrates the lack of guidance for statutory damage assessment and 
draws distinction between commercial and non-commercial 
infringement. The appellate court in Tenenbaum made a comment that 
where Congress intended to make this bifurcation between 
commercial and non-commercial use, it expressly did so in the Sound 
Recording Act of 1971 and the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 
(AHRA).161 So, there are inferences being made by different courts 
 
 154. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 721 F. Supp. 2d 85, 87 (D. Mass. 2010), 
aff’d in part, vacated in part, rev’d in part, 660 F.3d 487 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 89. 
 157. Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 490 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 158. Id. at 489-90, 509. 
 159. Id. at 508-09. 
 160. Id. at 508, 515. 
 161. Id. at 499; see also infra Part IV.A (discussing these two acts, their carved out 
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that there is a need for Congress to act and there may be validity to 
exploring the existence of the different categories of commercial and 
non-commercial use. 
In Maverick Recording Company v. Whitney Harper, the 
defendant, a high school student, downloaded thirty-seven songs from 
a file sharing program whereby she infringed on music labels 
copyrighted sound recordings (again similar to Thomas-Rasset and 
Tenenbaum).162 At the district court level, the judge ruled Ms. Harper 
infringed as a matter of law; however, she was entitled to have the 
jury determine if she was an innocent infringer.163 Plaintiffs’ motion 
for summary judgment (adjudication) as to liability for infringement 
was granted; however, the judge stated that question of whether Ms. 
Harper was an innocent infringer was a question for the jury.164 The 
judgment was for $200 per infringement.165 Plaintiffs appealed the 
judge’s ruling that the innocent infringement defense was a matter of 
fact, and Ms. Harper appealed as well.166 On appeal, the court held 
that innocent infringer defense was immaterial in this case since it 
was precluded by 17 U.S.C. § 402(d).167 This section prevents use of 
the innocent infringement defense when the defendant had access to 
the work that had proper copyright notice affixed to it.168 The court 
claimed that since plaintiffs had proper copyright notice on their 
phonorecords, Ms. Harper was barred from using innocent 
infringement as a defense to lower statutory damages.169 Therefore, 
according to the court, plaintiffs must be granted $750 for each 
infringement.170 
Ms. Harper’s attorneys filed a petition for writ of certiorari with 
the United States Supreme Court; however, it was denied.171 In their 
petition, Ms. Harper argued § 402(d) meant that only actual works 
with the copyrighted notice shall apply, and not works in other 
mediums that do not have such notice.172 Here, plaintiffs had proper 
 
exceptions, and applicability to statutory damages). 
 162. Maverick Recording Co. v. Harper, 598 F.3d 193, 194 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 163. Id. 
 164. See id. at 195. 
 165. Id. at 194. 
 166. Id. at 195. 
 167. Id. at 198-99. 
 168. Id. at 198. 
 169. Id. at 198-99. 
 170. Id. at 199. 
 171. Harper v. Maverick Recording Co., 131 S. Ct. 590 (2010). 
 172. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5-6, Harper, 131 S. Ct. 590 (2010) (No. 10-94), 2010 
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copyright notice on their physical compact discs or other physical 
embodiments of their music.173 They did not have any such notice on 
the recordings being downloaded, which gave a prospective infringer 
no notice. Ms. Harper thought her downloaded music was the 
equivalent of listening to an internet radio station.174 
Aside from the factual similarities of being a young person 
downloading music, Harper does not reveal any particular novelties 
regarding legal issues; it is just another illustration of the arbitrariness 
of statutory awards in the increasingly complex digital world. 
Unfortunately, Ms. Harper’s counsel did not raise any constitutional 
arguments with any degree of sufficiency at the trial level.175 
Therefore, we do not get any insight into this appellate court’s 
reasoning on the statutory damage issue, nor any commentary on 
constitutional due process violations. We also don’t get much 
information in terms of innocent infringement, since Ms. Harper had 
been foreclosed of the defense. The denial of the defense was due to 
the court’s interpretation that 17 U.S.C § 402(d)’s copyright notice 
requirements on plaintiffs’ tangible goods were sufficient to apply to 
electronic versions.176 What we do get is a view into the courts’ 
thinking as they applied § 504(c), with their resulting damage awards 
showing no connectivity to the harm caused. The courts make 
conclusory statements that such awards deter infringement with no 
offer of proof as to how. 
As music and other technologies advance, we are likely to see a 
proliferation of cases similar to these. This is particularly so when the 
technologies are first introduced, yet music isn’t the only area in 
which the concerns over statutory damages awards may grow. 
2. Case Law—News and Related Types of Information 
We live in a society that thirsts for information that can be 
obtained almost immediately. As blogs, websites and other vehicles 
for dissemination of information increase, the likelihood of 
infringements escalates too. The following is an example of copyright 
infringements alleged against various individuals and/or entities; 
however, the legitimacy of the allegations is challenged by the court. 
A Las Vegas-based company, Righthaven, LLC, claims to have 
 
WL 2797543. 
 173. Harper, 598 F.3d at 198-99. 
 174. See Harper, 598 F.3d at 195, 198. 
 175. Id. at 197. 
 176. Id. at 198-99. 
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been assigned the copyrights from the Las Vegas Review-Journal and 
the Denver Post for substantially all of their various copyrights 
pertaining to protectable news information.177 The company has filed 
approximately 275 federal lawsuits against owners of websites, blogs 
and message boards, claiming they are infringing on these copyrights 
by posting partial or full stories from their publications, including 
editorials, columns, graphics, and photos.178 
Unlike the music genre of cases, this newspaper category has 
just recently surfaced as a focus of media attention.179 These 
newspaper cases have already been receiving far different outcomes 
than the Tenenbaum, Thomas-Rasset, and other similar music cases. 
Granted, Righthaven, LLC has settled almost half of the lawsuits it 
originally filed in the range of a few thousand dollars each; however, 
recently Chief U.S. District Court Judge Roger Hunt of Nevada threw 
out the case of Righthaven, LLC v. Democratic Underground180 
(suing a blog) holding Righthaven did not have legal standing to sue, 
because it does not own any of the copyrights at issue. A company 
that is a partner in Righthaven, Stephens Media, owns the rights and 
only granted the rights to Righthaven to receive 50% of all proceeds 
in any lawsuits.181 As Judge Hunt noted, “a copyright owner cannot 
assign a bare right to sue.”182 The judge also gave a two week time 
frame upon which Righthaven must show the court in writing why it 
should not be sanctioned.183 
Companies like Righthaven have become known as “copyright 
trolls.”184 It is believed that those who even may have legitimate 
 
 177. Welcome to Righthaven Lawsuits, RIGHTHAVEN LAWSUITS, 
http://righthavenlawsuits.com/ (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
 178. Comprehensive List of Copyright Infringement Lawsuits Filed by Righthaven, LLC, 
RIGHTHAVEN LAWSUITS, http://www.righthavenlawsuits.com/lawsuits.html (last visited Jan. 11, 
2013). 
 179. See Comprehensive List of Articles Regarding Righthaven, LLC’s Copyright 
Infringement Lawsuits, RIGHTHAVEN LAWSUITS, 
http://www.righthavenlawsuits.com/articles.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2013); Steve Green, 
Hard-Fought Copyright Case Closed Against Righthaven, VEGAS INC (Mar. 24, 2012, 3:37 
PM), http://www.vegasinc.com/news/2012/mar/24/hard-fought-copyright-case-closed-against-
righthav/; Brendan McKenna, Righthaven’s House of Cards, CORPORATE COUNSEL (ONLINE) 
(Sept. 16, 2011). 
 180. Righthaven LLC v. Democratic Underground, LLC, 791 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979 (D. 
Nev. 2011). 
 181. Id. at 972, 979. 
 182. Id. at 973. 
 183. Id. at 979. 
 184. Copyright Trolls, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/copyright-
trolls (last visited Jan. 11, 2013); Ashby Jones, Vegas, Baby! Ruling a Possible Boon to 
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standing to sue based upon true ownership or appropriate assignment, 
are strictly filing the suits to extract (or possibly extort) settlements. 
Increasingly, judges have not been receptive to this type of tactic. 
Granted, cases filed by alleged copyright trolls seem to have 
ulterior motives by concocting shell arrangements in order to create a 
scheme to extort money; but we can still glean parallels to the music 
cases. As people develop, download, and share online content daily, 
the potential for the unassuming individual or even business entity to 
infringe upon a work of authorship can substantially grow. Just like 
the music cases, areas of content that are easily downloadable, such as 
news, general narrative content, images, photos, programs, and 
videos, are ripe for litigation. If we want to avoid clogging the court 
system with the damage issues litigated in the music cases, coupled 
with effectively compensating plaintiffs and deterring future 
infringements, a revised statutory damage structure needs to be 
created that ensures damage awards are built upon a foundation that 
can carry society as we mature in the digital age. 
As this article has explored, copyright acts and their amendments 
have tried to address the damage inconsistencies; yet we arguably 
have more infringements now than any other time in history.185 
Although this may be a result of more works of authorship existing; 
nonetheless, we know deterring infringements is on the mind of 
Congress since there has been ample debate over legislation to curb 
online piracy.186 The foregoing court decisions evidencing 
disconnects between statutory damages amounts and infringements 
giving rise to such damages, as well as current legislative discussions 
regarding reining in online piracy, demonstrate that it’s timely to truly 
 
“Copyright-Troll” Suits, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Sept. 3, 2010, 3:11 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/09/03/vegas-baby-ruling-a-possible-boon-to-copyright-troll-
suits/; Debra Cassens Weiss, “Attack Dog” Group Buys Newspaper Copyrights, Sues 86 
Websites, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 4, 2010, 5:34 AM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/attack_dog_group_buys_newspaper_copyrights_sues_8
6_websites/. 
 185. See PROTECT IP Act of 2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Stop Online 
Piracy Act of 2011, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011). This argument is based off of recent debate 
over enacting legislation to curb online piracy, particularly from rogue foreign infringers. There 
is an argument to be made that the purposes of deterring infringement are now more than ever 
not being fulfilled since we have a global economy with infringements occurring not only with 
the United States, but outside our jurisdiction. The heated debates from internet companies over 
how to legislate this problem lends itself to the fact we still have infringements on the rise. If we 
still have infringements and they are more rapidly occurring in the digital world, how effective 
has existing legislation been in deterring infringing conduct? 
 186. See, e.g., S. 968; H.R. 3261; see also Joe Donnini, Online Piracy Problem Calls for 
Global Attack, Not US Business-Based Approach, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 1, 2012, at 1. 
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reform statutory damage remedies. If we do so by building a better 
platform upon which to base damage amounts, we can also balance 
the compensation/deterrence analysis. An additional effect of this 
allows society to be enriched by the use of works without severe or 
grossly disproportionate outcomes. 
IV. DIGITAL DOMAIN AND NEW DAMAGE PARAMETERS: REVAMPING 
REMEDIES AND AMENDING § 504 
A. Setting the Stage for Reform: Sound Recording Act of 1971 
and Audio Home Recording of 1992 (AHRA) 
Of course piracy is nothing new. This problem has been a part of 
the copyright landscape since inception. Back in 1971, Congress 
enacted the Sound Recording Act of 1971187 to address the 
proliferation of copying of records and tapes. Prior to February 1972 
(the effective date of the Sound Recording Act of 1971), sound 
recordings188 were not protected by federal copyright law. After much 
debate, Congress enacted this statute with the hopes of combatting 
piracy. In order to do so, Congress had to include sound recordings in 
the definition of works of authorship in the 1976 Act.189 Once sound 
recordings were elevated to federal protection, enforcement of any 
infringements became a reality. Congress intentionally did not afford 
owners of sound recordings the exclusive right to public 
performance.190 Yet Congress did specifically exempt home 
 
 187. Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971). 
 188. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2011). 
“Sound recordings” are works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, 
spoken, or other sounds, but not including the sounds accompanying a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, regardless of the nature of the material objects, 
such as disks, tapes, or other phonorecords, in which they are embodied. 
Id. 
 189. § 102(a). 
Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later 
developed, from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise 
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device. Works of 
authorship include . . . 
  . . . 
 (7) sound recordings . . . . 
Id. 
 190. See Sound Recording Act of 1971, 85 Stat. 391; H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 11 (1995). 
There was much discussion between broadcasters and those representing performers’ interests, 
that performers benefit from the free playing of their songs on the radio in terms of greater 
exposure and most likely an increase in sales. As a result, broadcasters were able to lobby to 
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recordings that were for private use with no intention of making any 
commercial gain from any copyright protection.191 The report from 
the Committee on the Judiciary even goes as far as stating that private 
home use of recordings is “common and unrestrained today,”192 
implying acquiescence to acceptable norms of societal behavior. 
Furthermore, as technologies advanced throughout the 1980s, 
more devices came into existence that made reproducing copyrighted 
works much easier. Primarily fueled by the music industry, fear 
developed that new technologies would result in a mass number of 
unauthorized home recordings of copyrighted works, which in turn 
would be lost revenues that were estimated at $1 billion dollars.193 
The Copyright Office also conducted a study that concluded there 
may be a loss of revenues but the economic impact of such loss would 
be difficult to calculate.194 
As a result of much compromise, content publishers and device 
manufacturers reached an agreement, culminating in the Audio Home 
Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA).195 This statute provided for a tax or 
royalties on the sale of devices that manufacturers or importers must 
pay. This royalty equated to a 2%-3% transfer price on the sale of 
such devices, and the Copyright Office and Copyright Royalty 
Tribunal would be the administrating bodies overseeing such 
royalty.196 Additionally, much concern brewed over further copying 
of works beyond just the original. Therefore, AHRA provided for the 
Serial Copy Management System (SCMS), which limited copying of 
 
exclude this performance right when sound recordings became part of the Sound Recording Act 
of 1971. It wasn’t until 1995, that a limited performance right was granted. To accommodate 
new technologies, Congress enacted the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 
1995 in order to permit a limited public performance right in sound recordings by means of 
digital audio transmission. The purpose was to give some control to copyright holders of sound 
recordings the right to control distribution of their sound recordings via digital audio 
transmission. See S. REP. NO. 104-128, at 15 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 362. 
 191. See Sound Recording Act of 1971, 85 Stat. 391; see also Trademark Law Revision 
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 (1988); H.R. REP. NO. 92-487, at 7 (1971), 
reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1566, 1572. 
 192. H.R REP. NO. 92-487, at 7. 
 193. See S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 34 (1992) (citing The Audio Home Recording Act of 
1991: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 114-15 (1991) (statement of Jason S. Berman, President, 
Recording Industry Association of America)). 
 194. Id. at 35 (citing REGISTER OF COPYRIGHT, REPORT ON COPYRIGHT IMPLICATIONS OF 
DIGITAL AUDIO TRANSMISSION SERVICES 43 (1991)). 
 195. Audio Home Recording Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) 
(codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2011)). 
 196. See S. REP. NO. 102-294, at 39. 
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works by having coding in the devices that allows unlimited copying 
from an original copy, but didn’t allow further copies to take place 
thereafter.197 
Section 1008 of AHRA is of most interest. It provides: 
No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of 
copyright based on the manufacture, importation, or distribution of 
a digital audio recording device, a digital audio recording medium, 
an analog recording device, or an analog recording medium, or 
based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of such a device or 
medium for making digital musical recordings or analog musical 
recordings.198 
The last part of § 1008 is compelling. It deals with noncommercial 
use by a consumer who makes copies of digital or analog musical 
recordings. The definitions of “device” and “medium” play a key role 
in application of this section.199 Modern cases dealing with computers 
that download copyrighted works fall outside the scope of AHRA’s 
definition of device and medium; computers do not qualify as a 
device or medium under the statutory language because their 
“primary purpose” is not to make copies of recordings for private 
 
 197. Id. at 37, 64. Copying beyond the original source is also referred to as “first 
generation” copying; copying a copy is referred to as “second generation” copying. Id. Note that 
SCMS controlled copies from digital but not analog devices. Id. at 37. 
 198. 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2011). 
 199. See § 1001(3)-(4). 
(3) A “digital audio recording device” is any machine or device of a type 
commonly distributed to individuals for use by individuals, whether or not 
included with or as part of some other machine or device, the digital recording 
function of which is designed or marketed for the primary purpose of, and that is 
capable of, making a digital audio copied recording for private use, except for— 
 (A) professional model products, and 
 (B) dictation machines, answering machines, and other audio recording 
equipment that is designed and marketed primarily for the creation of sound 
recordings resulting from the fixation of nonmusical sounds. 
(4)(A) A “digital audio recording medium” is any material object in a form 
commonly distributed for use by individuals, that is primarily marketed or most 
commonly used by consumers for the purpose of making digital audio copied 
recordings by use of a digital audio recording device. 
 (B) Such term does not include any material object— 
 (i) that embodies a sound recording at the time it is first distributed by the 
importer or manufacturer; or 
 (ii) that is primarily marketed and most commonly used by consumers 
either for the purpose of making copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual 
works or for the purpose of making copies of nonmusical literary works, 
including computer programs or data bases. 
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use.200 
Regardless, AHRA’s § 1008 sets the stage for exemptions, or at 
least reductions in damages, for noncommercial use. While there is no 
statutory definition of commercial, or inversely noncommercial, 
common implications are that noncommercial implies no gain for 
profit or exposure in a commercial setting. To add to this notion, this 
article has already shared the comments of the courts in the Thomas-
Rasset and Tenenbaum cases relating to noncommercial versus 
commercial categorizations. As mentioned above, the Tenenbaum 
court indicated Congress may act with respect to specifically 
formalizing these categorizations through legislation, since it did so 
with the Sound Recording Act of 1971 and the Audio Home 
Recording Act of 1992.201 
It appears that the ingredients for a new structure have existed in 
fragmented pieces: Sound Recording Act of 1971’s exemption for 
private home recordings, AHRA’s exemption for noncommercial use 
of digital or analog copying of recordings, and recent court decisions 
writing about noncommercial versus commercial use. While the two 
pieces of legislation are not directly on point to the issues discussed 
regarding downloading and distributing in the digital domain, their 
rationales and premises have relevant application to solving our 
current problem. 
So, if we have the ingredients, what structure could they be 
incorporated into in order to aid in serving the original purposes of 
compensation and deterrence in statutory damages? It is prudent that 
the courts, Congress, or both develop a structure that allows for the 
general copyright goal of not only incentivizing and protecting works 
of authorship, but promoting a culture of sharing such works so as to 
benefit and enrich society. The next section proposes some 
suggestions. 
B. Building a New Set: Amending § 504(c) to Be More Effective 
Clarity is an obvious need in drafting any law in order to reduce 
the likelihood of litigation. To clarify application of § 504(c), this 
article suggests building into the statute a configuration reflecting 
further defining the terms “willfully” and “innocent infringer,” a 
 
 200. See Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 
1072, 1076 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that computer hard drives of defendant’s devices were 
specifically excluded from the plain language of the act since the primary purpose of the 
device’s hard drive is not to make copies). 
 201. See Sony BMG Music Entm’t v. Tenenbaum, 660 F.3d 487, 499 (1st Cir. 2011). 
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three-tiered categorization of damages, and a carve out for non-
commercial downloading only. 
1. Statutory Damages for Commercial or Non-
Commercial Infringement for Downloading 
and Distributing 
 The proposed primary structure for damages should change 
whether one is doing so for profit or dilution or loss of revenues 
through unauthorized distribution or not. While the statutory range of 
damages may be an acceptable measure, in order to permit 
predictability in business transactions and more tailored awards to 
private individuals; it may be necessary to give a more detailed 
definition to the terms “willfully” and “innocent infringer.” 
a. Definitions of “Willfully” and “Innocent 
Infringer” 
 Since cases like Fitzgerald had been interpreting their own 
definitions, it may behoove Congress to add clarity to these terms so 
as to minimize the risk of arbitrary or excess damages. One 
suggestion may be to invoke a higher standard for willfulness such as 
plaintiff having to prove actual intent in order to get higher statutory 
damages (as opposed to reckless behavior or just having mere 
knowledge). As for innocent infringer, while the language of § 504(c) 
may be acceptable, it should be clear that no burden shifting is 
necessary. In other words, once a defendant successfully proves to a 
trier of fact that defendant was unaware or had no reason to believe 
that he or she was infringing, damages should go to the statutory 
minimum of $200 per infringement. There should be no further need 
to allow plaintiff to refute clear evidence offered by the defendant or 
to allow the trier of fact to award “a sum not less than $200.”202 Once 
innocence has been proven, the award should be calculated at $200 
per infringement since this will effectuate more stability in business 
transactions by having more definite dollars amounts. Defendants still 
have the burden to adequately prove any such innocence. Since 
damage awards can be high, the evidence should be clear and 
convincing that the conduct correlates to either extreme (willful or 
innocent). 
 
 202. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2011). 
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b. Three-Tiered Range on Continuum of Statutory 
Damages 
Aside from definitions, if a commercial or non-commercial 
infringer downloads and distributes, they should face consequences; 
however, those consequences should be based upon a continuum of 
damage amounts. This means that if willfulness or innocence is not 
proven, then for each infringement that is, on that range of $750 to 
$30,000, there should be tiers within to calculate the subsets of a first, 
second, and/or third tier. Where to draw the three tiers is debatable; 
nonetheless, wherever the lines are drawn, they should serve to 
compensate plaintiffs, yet send messages to infringers that their 
continued infringements have more serious monetary significance. It 
is presumed that balancing damages with this tiered approach would 
accommodate the compensation and deterrence purposes, without 
rushing to penalize defendants. Defendants would have to pay for 
their infringements but would be on notice not to continue with such 
conduct, since the results would get increasingly harsh. 
2. Statutory Damages for Non-Commercial Infringements 
Based upon Downloading Only 
A carve out for non-commercial only downloading in the digital 
domain is extremely timely, as we have seen with the existence and 
proliferation of these cases in the court system. Based upon all the 
“ingredients” espoused throughout this article, this is the area that 
needs the most change. 
As the Sound Recording Act of 1971 and AHRA have 
illustrated, good reasons exist to exclude from liability any home 
recordings used solely for personal use. This tends to comport with 
the notions of enriching and balancing society’s interests that are 
ingrained in copyright law. Of course, this is not to say that copyright 
holders should not be protected because, as we have seen, they are. 
The proposed carve out is just to effectuate a more balanced approach 
that keeps in alignment with statutory damage purposes. 
For example, as technologies have increased online, we have 
seen the advent of streaming videos. Networks may place television 
shows and other content on their websites for viewing to help 
disseminate their content in multiple media formats for exposure and 
audience building. Now, if ABC Television Network puts one of its 
television shows on its website and a non-commercial user is able and 
wants to download it so as to have it available when he or she has no 
Internet access, should they be able to do so as a fair use similar to the 
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Betamax case?203 The same analogies can hold true for music and 
related content too. Naturally, if any distribution occurs by this non-
commercial “infringer,” the infringement escalates into the 
commercial category since plaintiff would experience a dilution or 
loss of revenues. 
CONCLUSION 
Statutory damages in copyright law have been a core component 
of the law since inception. Since the days of borrowing from the 
Statute of Anne to further developments in American statutes and 
case law, copyright damage law has grown, but has done so in a way 
that deviated from the original purpose of compensation and 
deterrence resulting in arbitrary and excessive awards. Through each 
revision of the copyright acts and the subsequent cases that interpret 
them, we have only seen the problem expand. As we have entered the 
digital age, Congress needs to take the opportunity to rebuild the 
statutory damage structure by injecting stability and comporting with 
the fundamental premise of protection for a copyright holders and 
promoting societal value by sharing works. It does not have to look 
too far back into history to take previous statutes it enacted to serve as 
a basis upon which to build a more effective statutory damage 
continuum. If it does so, statutory damages in the digital domain will 
be positioned to serve intended purposes and add guidance to the 
courts in their application. Reaching into these realities better serves 
copyright jurisprudence and establishes a new damage paradigm 
rather than repeating the old one. 
 
 203. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 418 (1984) (holding 
that “time shifting” on Betamax video tape recorders (VTRs) constituted fair use and that 
although VTRs were capable of infringing activity, the defendants did not infringe). 
